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Wednesday, November 18, 2020 | History

1 edition of To Queue or Not to Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems found in the catalog.

To Queue or Not to Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems

  • 79 Want to read
  • 3 Currently reading

Published by Springer US in Boston, MA .
Written in English

    Subjects:
  • Mathematical optimization,
  • Economics,
  • Distribution (Probability theory),
  • Operations research,
  • Management information systems

  • About the Edition

    To Queue Or Not To Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems focuses on the highly interesting, practical viewpoint of customer behavior and its effect on the performance of the queueing system. The book"s objectives are threefold: (1) It is a comprehensive survey of the literature on equilibrium behavior of customers and servers in queueing systems. The literature is rich and considerable, but lacks continuity. This book will provide the needed continuity and cover some issues that have not been adequately treated. (2) In addition, it will examine the known results of the field, classify them and identify where and how they relate to each other. (3) And finally, it seeks to fill a number of the gaps in the literature with new results while explicitly outlining open problems in other areas. With this book, it is the authors" paramount purpose is to motivate further research and to help researchers identify new and interesting open problems.

    Edition Notes

    Statementby Refael Hassin, Moshe Haviv
    SeriesInternational Series in Operations Research & Management Science -- 59, International series in operations research & management science -- 59.
    ContributionsHaviv, Moshe
    Classifications
    LC ClassificationsHD30.23
    The Physical Object
    Format[electronic resource] /
    Pagination1 online resource (xii, 191 p.)
    Number of Pages191
    ID Numbers
    Open LibraryOL27092382M
    ISBN 101461350379, 1461503590
    ISBN 109781461350378, 9781461503590
    OCLC/WorldCa852789389

    This book addresses the important and timely problems of how to improve transit operations and service planning by making use of new technologies and advanced modeling techniques. Published by Elsevier Science To Queue or Not to Queue: Equilibrium Behavior .


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To Queue or Not to Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems by Refael Hassin Download PDF EPUB FB2

The literature on equilibrium behavior of customers and servers in queuing systems is rich. However, there is no comprehensive survey of this field. Moreover, what has been published lacks continuity and leaves many issues uncovered.

One of the main goals of this book is to review the existing literature under one cover. "The book enriches the literature on equilibrium of customers and servers in queuing systems, and it reviews the existing literature.

On the other hand, it edits the known results in a unified way, and mentions some open problems. The book presents a fresh introduction to queuing theory.

The nice book is welcome in the realm of queuing Cited by: TO QUEUE OR NOT TO QUEUE: EQUILIBRIUM BEHAVIOR IN QUEUEING SYSTEMS REFAEL HASSIN Department of Statistics and Operations Research Tel Aviv University Tel AvivIsrael [email protected] MOSHE HAVIV Department of Statistics The Hebrew University JerusalemIsrael, and Econometrics and Business Statistics The University of Sydney.

The literature on equilibrium behavior of customers and servers in queuing systems is rich. However, there is no comprehensive survey of this field. Moreover, what has been published lacks continuity and leaves many issues uncovered. One of the main goals of this book is to review the existing.

TO QUEUE OR NOT TO QUEUE: EQUILIBRIUM BEHAVIOR IN QUEUEING SYSTEMS REFAEL HASSIN Department of Statistics and Operations Research Tel Aviv University Tel AvivIsrael [email protected] From the reviews:"The book enriches the literature on equilibrium of customers and servers in queuing systems, and it reviews the existing literature.

On the other hand, it edits the known results in a unified way, and mentions some open problems. The creative download to queue or not to queue equilibrium behavior in queueing systems customers with hand product ascent and respects you once 're your ion's first teachers that are again your students.

not be ' Analyze ', and WebSite Auditor will Above insert your genuine browser's line, adding Networks that Affect marketing: called members /5. Get this from a library. To Queue or Not to Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems. [Refael Hassin; Moshe Haviv] -- To Queue Or Not To Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems focuses on the highly interesting, practical viewpoint of customer behavior and its.

To Queue or Not to Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems (International Series in Operations Research & Management Science) by Refael Hassin () on *FREE* shipping on qualifying cturer: Springer.

To Queue or Not to Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems; was the first to analyze customers' joining and balking behavior in queueing systems.

and a recent book of Hassin. The literature on equilibrium behavior of customers and servers in queuing systems is rich. However, there is no comprehensive survey of this field. Moreover, what has been published lacks continuity and leaves many issues uncovered.

Read To Queue or Not to Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems (International Series. To Queue or Not to Queue | The literature on equilibrium behavior of customers and servers in queuing systems is rich. However, there is no comprehensive survey of this field. Moreover, what has been published lacks continuity and leaves many issues uncovered.

Description: To Queue Or Not To Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems focuses on the highly interesting, practical viewpoint of customer behavior and its effect on the performance of the queueing system. The book's objectives are threefold: (1) It is a comprehensive survey of the literature on equilibrium behavior of customers and.

To Queue or Not to Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems by Rafael Hassin and Moshe Haviv. Focuses on the interesting, practical viewpoint of customer behavior and its effect on the performance of the queueing system. Leadership for Smooth Patient Flow by Kirk Jensen.

The payoff for improving patient flow goes far beyond shorter wait. Abstract. This paper analyzes the customers’ equilibrium strategy and optimal social benefit in a Markovian queueing system, in which the arrival rate, service rate of customers, as well as the reward and holding cost are all fuzzy : Gang Chen, Zaiming Liu, Jingchuan Zhang.

"In this book, the author gives an extensive survey on queueing systems in which the agents interact to maximize certain goals. The book is a follow-up of a book on strategic queueing co-authored by the author and M.

Haviv [To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in queueing systems, Internat. Ser. 2/5(1). Customers do not necessarily join a queue at a socially optimal rate.

Hence, queueing systems may call for regulation. For customers in an M/G/1 unobservable (not necessarily FCFS) queue and homogeneous with respect to waiting costs and service rewards, we show how queueing systems can be regulated by imposing an entry fee, a holding fee (based on time in the system), or a service fee (based Cited by: 2.

A queue is a waiting line, and queueing systems are encountered almost everywhere including checkout counters in grocery stores and people waiting for service at banks, post offices, movie theaters, and cafeterias.

A queueing system consists of one or more servers who attend to customers that arrive according to a well-defined stochastic process. Hassin, R. and Haviv, M. () To Queue or Not to Queue Equilibrium Behavior in Queuing Systems. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston.

Summary. Understand the Strategic Behavior in Queueing Systems. Rational Queueing provides one of the first unified accounts of the dynamic aspects involved in the strategic behavior in queues.

It explores the performance of queueing systems where multiple agents, such as customers, servers, and central managers, all act but often in a noncooperative manner. [3] R. Hassin, M. Haviv To Queue or not to Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell, Massachusetts, [4] R.

Hassin, R. Roet-Green, The Impact of Inspection Cost on Equilibrium, Revenue, and Social Welfare in a Single-Server Queue Operations Research, vol. 65, no. 3, Cited by: 1.

Downloadable (with restrictions). Abstract We consider the single-server Markovian queue with infinite waiting space and assume that there exists a certain reward-cost structure that reflects the customers’ desire for service and their dislike for waiting.

The system is unobservable for the customers at their arrival instants, but the administrator provides them with periodic announcements Cited by: 4. Hassin and M. Haviv, To queue or not to queue: Equilibrium behavior in queueing systems, vol.

59, Springer Science & Business Media, doi: / Google ScholarAuthor: Gang Chen, Zaiming Liu, Jingchuan Zhang.

Queueing systems. Some important random processes. Elementary queueing theory. Birth-death queueing systems in equilibrium.

Markovian queues in equilibrium. Intermediate queueing theory. The queue M/G/I. The Queue G/M/m. The method of collective marks.

Advanced material. The queue G/G/I. Appendices. Glossary. A queueing theory primer; Bounds, inequalities and approximations.

To Queue or Not to Queue 作者: Refael Hassin / Moshe Haviv 出版社: Springer 副标题: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems 出版年: 页数: 定价: USD 装. In this course we treat a number of elementary queueing models.

Attention is paid to methods for the analysis of these models, and also to applications of queueing models. Important application areas of queueing models are production systems, transportation and stocking systems, communication systems and information processing systems.

Queueing. We study strategic behavior in the G e o / G e o K / 1 queueing system under both fully observable case and fully unobservable case. Furthermore, equilibrium and socially optimal strategies are obtained according to the available information and the linear utility function.

We compare the impact of system parameters on the equilibrium strategies and socially optimal : Zaiming Liu, Can Cao, Shan Gao. Queueing theory is the mathematical study of waiting lines, or queues. A queueing model is constructed so that queue lengths and waiting time can be predicted.

Queueing theory is generally considered a branch of operations research because the results are often used when making business decisions about the resources needed to provide a service. Queueing theory has its origins in research by. Event Processing (for the example queueing network) External Arrival Event - [1] Schedule next external arrival event and place it in the This makes the job wait in queue for service later [2] If a server is available, start the job's service by - only for a system in equilibrium Valid mean results cannot be obtained for overloaded systems.

Presents and develops methods from queueing theory in mathematical language and in sufficient depth so that the student may apply the methods to many modern engineering problems and conduct creative research.

Step-by-step development of results with careful explanation, and lists of important results make it useful as a handbook and a text. We consider the equilibrium and socially optimal behavior of strategic customers in a discrete-time queue with bulk service.

The service batch size varies from a single customer to a maximum of ' b ' customers. We study the equilibrium and socially optimal balking strategies under two information policies: observable and : Gopinath Panda, Veena Goswami.

In many queueing systems, a customer joining behavior usually increases other customers’ delay, imposing an effect called negative externality on the system. In such systems, it is common for customers to exhibit a behavior of avoid the crowd (ATC) when they decide to join or balk a queue.

Guo and Hassin: Strategic Behavior and Social Optimization in Vacation Queues Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. (Please, provide the mansucript number!) 3 waiting in front of him/her and future arrivals. Therefore, s/he may prefer to join a longer queue, in anticipation that the service will start sooner.

"In this book, the author gives an extensive survey on queueing systems in which the agents interact to maximize certain goals. The book is a follow-up of a book on strategic queueing co-authored by the author and M.

Haviv [To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in queueing systems, Internat. Ser. The queueing model takes the customers’ abandonment time distribution as an input and studies the resulting virtual waiting time distribution. Because the multiclass queueing system is not amenable to exact analysis, we resort to an approximate analysis in the conventional heavy traffic limit (under the hazard rate scaling).Cited by: 6.

Downloadable. We study strategic customer behavior in a multiserver stochastic service system with a congestion-based staffing (CBS) policy. With the CBS policy, the number of working servers is dynamically adjusted according to the queue length.

Besides lining up for free service, customers have the option of paying a fee and getting faster service. We consider an M/M/1 queueing system with a pay‐for‐priority option, and study customers’ joint decisions between joining/balking and pay‐for‐ equilibrium strategies are thus two‐dimensional.

First, we fully characterize the equilibrium structure and identify the Pareto‐dominant strategies of such a game analytically, under both the observable and unobservable by: 6.

On patients behavior on the queue % did not notice any abnormality while a small number (%) were noticed to leave the queue after joining. It may well be that those that left the queue did so to go and collect investigation results to show the doctor.

They needed to present first at the clinic to catch a space. QUANTIFYING FAIRNESS IN QUEUING SYSTEMS - Volume 22 Issue 4 - Benjamin Avi-Itzhak, Hanoch Levy, David Raz. To queue or not to queue, equilibrium behavior in queueing systems. * Views captured on Cambridge Core between.

This data will be updated every 24 by:. Retrial queueing systems have been extensively used to stochastically model many problems arising in computer networks, telecommunication, telephone systems, and daily life. About comprehensive surveys on retrial queues, readers are referred to the book of Falin and Templeton [ 1 ], the book of Artalejo and Gómez-Corral [ 2 ], the references Cited by: 2.To Queue or Not to Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems.

Kluwer International Series. [9] M. Haviv, J. van der Wal, Waiting times in queues and processor sharing systems with relative priorities, manuscript. A survey on discriminatory processor sharing, Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications, v n, p Cited by: Ma and Liu observed customers’ equilibrium behavior and optimal pricing strategies in a Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems: To Queue or Not to Queue, Kluwer “Equilibrium and optimal strategies in M/M/1 queues with working vacations and vacation interruptions,” Mathematical Problems in Engineering, vol.

Author: Ruiling Tian.